Formal Models in Normative Political Theory (coauthored with Hun Chung)
Abstract: This paper revisits the conventional distinction in political science between “positive” and “normative” political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and they can provide insights into the practical workings of novel institutional arrangements in the absence of empirical data. The integration of formal models into normative political theory presents challenges, including the development of criteria for evaluating these models and potential shifts in research focus. Integration can also strengthen political theory’s tenuous role in the political science discipline.
Creative Destruction and the Autonomous Life
Abstract: This paper examines the tension between creative destruction—an inherent feature of capitalist economies—and the ideal of autonomy. Creative destruction is vital for economic growth, but it undermines the conditions necessary for autonomy by disrupting individuals’ ability to plan their lives. This creates a dilemma: we must either abandon the ideal of autonomy or economic growth. The paper explores potential regulatory strategies to mitigate the impact of disruptive innovation on life plans, but argues these ultimately fail. It then proposes a novel conception of autonomy consistent with capitalist creative destruction. With artificial intelligence poised to initiate unparalleled creative destruction, understanding this dilemma and potential solutions is crucial from an ethical perspective. The paper contends its revised conception of autonomy offers a path forward amidst transformative technological change.
The Moral Status of Pecuniary Externalities (coauthored with Jeffrey Carroll)
Abstract: Pecuniary externalities—costs imposed on third parties mediated through the price system—have typically received little philosophical attention. Recently, this has begun to change. In two separate papers, Richard Endörfer (2022) and Hayden Wilkinson (2022) place pecuniary externalities at center stage. Though their arguments differ significantly, both conclude pecuniary externalities are in some sense morally problematic. If the state is not called on to regulate pecuniary externalities, then, at the very least, individuals should be conscious of how their productive and consumptive decisions affect others by changing prices. We disagree. Both arguments fail, in that neither gives us reason to think pecuniary externalities are cause for moral concern. Unless a new argument emerges, pecuniary externalities should be left alone.
Political Epistemology (coauthored with Aylon Manor)
Abstract: Entry for the next edition of The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy.
There Is No Right To a Competent Electorate (coauthored with Jeffrey Carroll)
Abstract: This paper addresses the debate surrounding epistocracy. While many discussions of epistocracy focus on its instrumental defenses, this paper aims to critically examine the non-instrumental jury argument offered by Jason Brennan. Brennan’s argument equates the rights of individuals in political decisions to their rights in jury decisions, asserting that just as individuals have a right to a competent jury, they likewise have a right to a competent electorate. We disagree. By juxtaposing the costs of enforcing such rights and the severity of the harm prevented by their enforcement, this paper argues in favor of maintaining the right to a competent jury while denying the existence of a right to a competent electorate. The central claim is that while securing a competent jury is feasible and vital, attempting to secure a competent electorate poses significant challenges and may prevent less significant harm than perceived.
In Defense of Filibustering
Abstract: The Senate filibuster is among the most criticized political institutions in the United States. This paper examines the ethics of filibustering. The way filibustering currently proceeds in the Senate, I argue, is morally indefensible. Yet, there is a way filibustering could proceed that is both defensible and desirable from a normative perspective. This is because filibustering—if it is properly institutionalized—allows minority parties in the legislature to protect and advance their interests in a manner that avoids shortcomings faced by other institutions proposed to accomplish these goals, such as supermajority rule and judicial review.
In Defense of (Limited) Oligarchy
Abstract: In democracies around the world, the rich exercise a disproportionate share of political power. Democratic theorists universally condemn this. The current paper brings balance to this conversation by mustering a defense of limited oligarchy. I have two goals. First, I shall argue that we need not be overly despondent about the wealthy’s outsized influence, for overrepresentation of the wealthy performs some good for us, good which might not be entirely obvious at first glance. Second, I hope to temper reform efforts that seek to limit the wealthy’s influence. While the people should have a greater say than they currently do, the wealthy’s influence should still be greater than what their numbers suggest. I ultimately embrace oligarchic bicameralism, an old idea that proposes ordinary persons be represented in the lower chamber of the legislature, and property be represented in the upper. This is accomplished through a combination of sortition and elections.
In Defense of Knavish Constitutions
Abstract: A tradition in political economy holds that constitutions should be designed under the assumption that politicians are knaves. A criticism of this position says that a constitution so designed will cause political actors to behave worse than they otherwise would. Designing a constitution for knaves creates knaves. I critique this argument in the current paper. I advance two claims. First, all constitutions create knaves, because the activity of politics itself creates knaves. Second, knavish constitutions better cultivate virtue when compared to constitutions that lack knavish constraints and guardrails. Put together, the two arguments imply the criticism has it exactly backwards: if you want virtuous politicians, design constitutions under the assumption that they are knaves.
The Demand and Supply of False Consciousness
Abstract: Why do oppressive social and political systems persist for as long as they do? Critical theorists posit the oppressed are in the grip of ideology or false consciousness, leading them to voluntarily accept their servitude. An objection to this explanation points out that we have no account of how the ruling class’s ideology comes to dominate. One common reply says the ruling class’s ideology comes to dominate because they control major organizations like schools, churches, and news agencies. This response is seriously flawed, I argue. I then explore an alternative, neglected answer: the ruling class’s ideology dominates because believing it is good for the oppressed. After sketching some details, I explore the implications of this account for critical theory as a research program.
We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth
Abstract: Why pursue economic growth? For poor countries this is an easy question to answer, but it is more difficult for rich ones. Some of the world’s greatest philosophers and economists—such as John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and John Rawls—thought that, once a certain material standard of well-being has been achieved, economic growth should stop. I argue the opposite in this paper. We always have reason to pursue economic growth. My argument is indirect. I shall not argue that economic growth itself is always better. Rather, I shall argue that stopping growth requires morally objectionable actions. Economic growth tends to occur naturally if certain underlying conditions are in place. We have moral reasons to insist on these conditions independent their effect on growth, however. Halting growth requires we alter these conditions, but we ought not do this.
Finding the Epistocrats
Abstract: Concerned about widespread incompetence among voters in democratic societies, epistocrats propose quasi-democratic electoral systems that amplify the voices of competent voters while silencing (or perhaps just subduing) the voices of those deemed incompetent. In order to amplify the voices of the competent we first need to know what counts as political competence, and then we need a way of identifying those who possess the relevant characteristics. After developing an account of what it means to be politically competent, I argue that there is no way for the epistocrat to identify such persons. Therefore, epistocracy cannot be implemented.
Public Choice and Political Equality
Abstract: Public choice theory is a branch of economics that analyzes political institutions using the tools and methods of economics. This essay is about what public choice theory can teach us about political equality as a normative ideal, by focusing on the relationship between rent seeking and political inequality. One important lesson public choice theory teaches us is that political inequality is sometimes driven by unequal wealth, but is at other times driven by other, more subtle factors. Thus, even if we lived in a society where wealth was distributed in a perfectly equal manner, political inequality would still be a significant problem. Beyond teaching us about some of the root causes of political inequality, public choice theorists have also offered novel proposals for how to remedy this problem. Thus, by engaging the literature on public choice, philosophers can gain new insights about how to fight a pervasive problem confronting democratic societies.
Does Equality Persist? Evidence from the Homestead Act (coauthored with Bryan Leonard)
Abstract: Passed in 1862, the Homestead Act was an important piece of legislation that gave away 160 acres of land in the Western United States to any individual willing to settle, cultivate, and occupy the land for a period of five years. Social scientists have examined the various impacts of the act extensively, but not in terms of its original aims. Many of those who fought for passage of the act rested their case on the moral claim that all persons have an equal right to the soil. This paper examines the extent to which the Homestead Act actually lived up to this moral ideal. We ask: did the Homestead Act lead to greater equality in the ownership of land? We find that the act did achieve greater equality in the short run but, in the long run, this equality proved fleeting, disappearing within 100 years of the act’s passage. Click here for online appendix.
Reparations to the Privileged?
Abstract: Many believe that we owe reparations to groups who suffered significant injustice in the past. Oftentimes, groups who suffered historical injustice are not very well-off today, especially when compared to the groups who imposed the injustice on them. However, in some cases, groups who suffered historical injustice are better-off today than the groups who imposed the injustice on them. Under these circumstances, ought the now-better-off group who suffered historical injustice receive reparations from the now-worse-off group who were historical oppressors? Many will think not. Problematically, most of our current theories of reparations, I demonstrate, imply that worse-off groups must pay reparations to better-off groups, if the worse-off group committed a serious injustice against the better-off group in the past. Those theories that avoid this conclusion do so only by severely limiting when reparations are owed generally, leading them to counterintuitive results in more ordinary cases.
Lockeans against Labor Mixing
Abstract: The idea that labor mixing confers property in unowned resources is, for many, the very heart of the Lockean system of property. In this essay I shall argue that this common view is mistaken. Lockean theorists should reject labor mixing as the preferred method of first appropriation, and should adopt a different account of first appropriation instead. This is because labor mixing does not serve the central justification for the institution of property embraced by Lockeans. Thus, my argument is internal to the Lockean system; I rely only on premises that (many) Lockean theorists embrace. Though Lockeans should forsake labor mixing, that does not mean they should give up on property rights and the idea of first appropriation. In the paper’s final section, I sketch an account of first appropriation that Lockeans should embrace.
Secrecy and Transparency in Political Philosophy
Abstract: an overview of secrecy and transparency as they relate to questions in political philosophy, with an emphasis on the relevance of literature from economics and political science.
Asymmetric Idealization and the Market Process
Abstract: An essay on political philosophy methodology and market process theory.
When Public Reason Falls Silent: Liberal Democratic Justification versus the Administrative State (coauthored with Stephen G.W. Stich)
Abstract: Public reason theorists argue that coercive state action must be justified to those subject to such action. Doing so requires that reasons are given in defense of coercive policies that all can accept. These reasons, we argue, include scientific and social scientific considerations. One ineliminable and arguably salutary property of the modern administrative state is that the coercive policies it produces can be justified only on the basis of extremely complex scientific and social scientific considerations. Many of these considerations are neither understood by most ordinary citizens, nor are they agreed upon by experts. This means that the overwhelming majority of citizens do not accept the reasons justifying coercive administrative policies. As a result, public reason is inconsistent with the administrative state. There are deep implications to this result: if public reason is inconsistent with the administrative, then it is also inconsistent with forms of social organization that presuppose it. This, we argue, includes egalitarianism, which many proponents of public reason also endorse. Public reason theorists must thus choose: justification through public reason, or distributive equality?
Kant, Rawls, and the Possibility of Autonomy
Abstract: One feature of John Rawls’s well-ordered society in both A Theory of Justice (TJ) and Political Liberalism (PL) is that citizens in the well-ordered society, when adhering to the principles of justice governing that society, realize their full autonomy. This notion of full autonomy is explicitly Kantian. This constancy, I shall argue, raises problems. Though the model of the well-ordered society presented in TJ is arguably consistent with Kant’s notion of autonomy, the model of the well-ordered society presented in PL is not. The problem is that in the well-ordered society of PL people’s reasons for complying with the principles of justice are overdetermined in a problematic way. This raises the interesting question of acting from overdetermined motives in Kant’s system of ethics. In this paper I argue that regardless of which plausible interpretation of acting from overdetermined motives we adopt, the prospect of citizens realizing their full autonomy in Rawls’s PL are small. This is a serious defect of the theory.
The Future of Political Philosophy: Non-Ideal and West of Babel
Abstract: Within the last decade or so, political philosophers have undergone intense disagreement over the proper methodology of political philosophy. This paper contributes to and tries to move past this debate by offering a new way of thinking about what it is political philosophers are trying to do. Instead of being either ideal or non-ideal theorists, political philosophers can orient themselves east of Eden or west of Babel. After examining different possible research projects, I argue that the most promising route forward for political philosophers is theorizing that is non-ideal and west of Babel. The paper ends by articulating what such a research program might look like.
Rawlsian Originalism (coauthored with Alexander William Salter)
Abstract: How should judges reason in a well-ordered constitutional democracy? According to John Rawls’s famous remarks in Political Liberalism, they ought to do so in accordance with the idea of public reason, to the point that they act as an (if not the) institutional exemplar of public reason. There are many attractive features of this view, but it is still too vague. For the idea of public reason is permissive – it rules certain modes of reasoning and discourse out, but the modes of reasoning and discourse it deems permissible are pluralistic. The current paper tries to remedy this indeterminacy by further fleshing out how judges ought to reason in something like a Rawlsian well-ordered constitutional democratic society. Our conclusion may come as a surprise: judges in such a society should be Originalists.
The Supreme Court as the Fountain of Public Reason
Abstract: The idea of public reason requires that citizens in their public deliberation employ considerations stemming from a shared conception of justice. One worry is that public reason’s content will be incomplete, in that it does not contain sufficient material for adequate public debate. Rawls has a way of expanding the content of public reason to address such concerns – by including in public reason all those things you and me say in our justification of the conception of justice. After arguing that this strategy fails, a new way of expanding public reason’s content is proposed. Instead of understanding the Supreme Court – who Rawls famously calls the “exemplar” of public reason – as an institution that appeals to exogenously determined public reasons, we should understand the judicial authority in a liberal democratic society as an endogenous fountain of public reason.
Moral Diversity and Moral Responsibility (coauthored with Robert H. Wallace)
Abstract: In large, impersonal moral orders many of us wish to maintain good will towards our fellow citizens only if we are reasonably sure they will maintain good will towards us. The mutual maintaining of good will, then, requires we somehow communicate our intentions to one another. But how do we actually do this? The current paper argues that when we engage in moral responsibility practices – that is, when we express our reactive attitudes by blaming, praising, and resenting – we communicate a desire to maintain good will to those in the community we are imbedded in. Participating in such practices alone won’t get the job done, though, for expressions of our reactive attitudes are often what economists call cheap talk. But, when we praise and blame in cases of moral diversity, expressions of our reactive attitudes act as costly signals capable of solving our social dilemma.
Enough and as Good: a Formal Model of Lockean First Appropriation (coauthored with Benjamin Ogden)
Abstract: In developing a theory of the first appropriation of natural resources from the state of nature John Locke tells us that persons must leave “enough and as good” for others. Detailing exactly what this restriction requires divides right and left libertarians. Briefly, right libertarians interpret “enough and as good” as requiring no or very minimal restrictions on the first appropriation of natural resources, whereas left libertarians interpret “enough and as good” as requiring everyone be entitled to an equal share of unappropriated resources, able to claim no more beyond this equal share. This paper approaches the right versus left libertarian debate by developing a formal model that examines the welfare properties of different interpretations of the Lockean proviso. The model shows that underlying philosophical justifications for left libertarianism, when plausible assumptions hold, will actually be better served by a right libertarian proviso rather than a left libertarian one.
Diversity and Rights: a Social Choice-Theoretic Analysis of the Possibility of Public Reason (coauthored with Hun Chung)
Abstract: Public reason liberalism takes as its starting point the deep and irreconcilable diversity we find characterizing liberal societies. This deep and irreconcilable diversity creates problems for social order. One method for adjudicating these conflicts is through the use of rights. This paper is about the ability of such rights to adjudicate disputes when perspectival disagreements – or disagreements over how to categorize objects in the world – obtain. We present both formal possibility and impossibility results for rights structures under varying degrees of perspectival diversity. We show that though perspectival diversity appears to be a troubling problem for the prospect of stable social order, if rights are defined properly then disagreements can likely be resolved in a consistent manner, achieving social cooperation rather than conflict.
Justificatory Failures and Moral Entrepreneurs: a Hayekian Theory of Public Reason
Abstract: Public reason liberalism says that in order to treat persons as free and equal they must accept the rules we impose on them as justified. A trite yet powerful criticism of the public reason project says that, given the diversity we find characterizing contemporary liberal societies, there are no rules meeting such a requirement. This paper uses the tools and insights from F.A. Hayek’s social philosophy to respond to such an objection. It argues first that the strong version of this criticism relies on assumptions that Hayek shows are untenable. But still, there is a modified version of this objection that does not commit such errors. Even so, Hayek’s insights show us that, through market competition acting as a discovery procedure, we can find rules and institutions that we do not yet know of capable of living up to the public reason liberal’s justificatory demands. This, it is argued, is the best hope we have of satisfying the twin ideals of freedom and equality lying at the very heart of liberalism.
Buchanan and Arrow on Democracy, Impossibility and Market
Abstract: In Social Choice and Individual Values Kenneth Arrow advances the claim that his impossibility theorem indicts both voting and the market as irrational methods of collective choice. Though most ignored such remarks and took the theorem to indict only democratic voting procedures, James M. Buchanan did take Arrow’s remarks seriously and argued that, contra Arrow’s initial claim, the theorem indicts voting but not the market. This paper analyzes the Arrow-Buchanan debate on this point: whether the famous impossibility theorem indicts voting and the market as Arrows claims, or just voting as Buchanan claims. It concludes that, due to certain features of the market process highlighted by Buchanan, Arrow’s impossibility theorem indicts voting as an irrational method of collective choice but leaves untouched the market.
Rawls, Buchanan, and the Search for a Better Social Contract
Abstract: This paper explores the strengths and weaknesses of John Rawls’s and James M. Buchanan’s social contract theories through the lens of two plausible success conditions any social contract theory ought to satisfy: what we call the identity and recognition tests. We find both successes and failings in both theories: whereas Rawls’s theory excels across recognition but fails across identity, Buchanan’s theory succeeds across identity but falters when it comes to recognition. To end, a new model of the social contract is proposed that combines the best elements of Rawls’s and Buchanan’s respective theories. The final result, hopefully, is a superior model of the social contract that displays greater fidelity to the original goals of the social contract enterprise in the first place.
Public Reason's Chaos Theorem
Abstract: Citizens in John Rawls’s well-ordered society face an assurance dilemma. They wish to act justly only if they are reasonably sure their fellow citizens will also act justly. According to Rawls, this assurance problem is solved through public reasoning. This paper argues that public reason cannot serve this function. It begins by arguing that one kind of incompleteness public reason faces that most Rawlsians grant is ubiquitous but unproblematic from a normative standpoint is problematic from an assurance perspective: it makes it possible for citizens to argue for policy conclusions that are favored by their private interests, rather than justice. In response, perhaps the thing to do is structure deliberative democratic institutions such that citizens will always be incentivized to use public reasons to only argue for conclusions they believe are favored by justice. The paper proves that this is impossible by extending the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
What We Choose, What We Prefer
Abstract: This paper develops an account of what it is that rational agents choose and what it is that rational agents prefer. There are three desiderata to satisfy when offering such an account. First, the account should maintain canonical axioms of rational choice theory as intuitively plausible. Here I focus on contraction and expansion consistency properties. Second, the account should prevent canonical axioms of rational choice theory from becoming trivial – it should be possible to actually violate these axioms, less rational choice theory becomes useless for many purposes. Third, the account should allow rational choice theory to be put to several different philosophical projects. I show that existing accounts of what we choose and prefer fail along at least one of these metrics. The account I develop does not fail across any of these metrics.
Aggregating Out of Indeterminacy: Social Choice Theory to the Rescue
Abstract: This paper explores public reason liberalism’s indeterminacy problem, a problem that obtains when we admit significant diversity into our justificatory model. The paper argues first that Gerald Gaus’s solution to the indeterminacy problem is unsatisfactory and second that, contra Gaus’s concerns, social choice theory is able to solve public reason’s indeterminacy problem. Moreover, social choice theory can do so in a way that avoids the worries raised against Gaus’s solution to the indeterminacy problem as well as the worries Gaus himself raises against the use of social choice mechanisms. Social choice theory thus rescues public reason liberalism by aggregating out of indeterminacy
Justice, Diversity, and the Well-Ordered Society
Abstract: One unchanging feature of Rawls’s thought is that we theorize about well-ordered societies. Yet, once we introduce justice pluralism – the fact that reasonable people disagree about the nature and requirements of justice, something Rawls eventually admits is inevitable in liberal societies – then a well-ordered society as Rawls defines it is impossible. This requires we develop new models of society to replace the well-ordered society in order to adequately address such disagreements. To do so we ought to remain faithful to those reasons Rawls has for introducing the idea of the well-ordered society in the first place. It is shown that two models that resemble closely Rawls’s model of the well-ordered society but are also capable of dealing with justice pluralism do not perform well when judged against such criteria. Yet a new model of the well-ordered society – one that looks radically different from what Rawls originally imagined – does succeed.
When Public Reason Fails Us: Convergence Discourse as Blood Oath (coauthored with Stephen G.W. Stich)
Abstract: Public officials in John Rawls’s well-ordered society face an assurance problem. They prefer to act in accordance with the political conception of justice, but only if they are assured that others will do so. On Paul Weithman’s influential interpretation, Rawls attempts to solve the assurance problem by claiming that public reason is an assurance mechanism. There are several major problems with Rawls’s solution: public reason talk is too cheap to facilitate assurance, it is difficult to know when a given utterance expresses a public reason, and the requirements of public reason are in tension with the fact of reasonable pluralism. In this paper we argue that convergence discourse – not public reason – solves the assurance problem because it is a costly signal that indicates commitment to the political conception. This solution has none of Rawls’s problems, and has an interesting corollary: the more diversity, the better.
Rational Choice Theory (coauthored with Gerald Gaus)
Abstract: An overview of rational choice theory and its applications to political philosophy.
The Irrelevance of the Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism (coauthored with Stephen G.W. Stich)
Abstract: In “The Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism” Braham and van Hees prove that four conditions on rights—completeness, conclusiveness, non-imposition, and symmetry—cannot be satisfied simultaneously. If Braham and van Hees’s proof is to have any relevance, at least some prominent libertarians must endorse their four conditions, and libertarianism as a philosophical position must in some way be committed to all the axioms. In this paper we demonstrate the irrelevance of Braham and van Hees’s proof by showing that some of the most prominent libertarians do not endorse the completeness and conclusive conditions, and that there is nothing about libertarianism as a philosophical position that commits the libertarian to these two axioms. Indeed, we show that, more generally, there are strong reasons for libertarians to reject both conditions. As such, libertarians should not lose any sleep over Braham and van Hees’s proof.
Modeling the Individual for Constitutional Choice
Abstract: This paper is about the use of the homo economicus behavioral model in the constitutional political economy research program. The paper argues that all existing arguments in defense of the behavioral model fail. These arguments are: the symmetry argument, the enterprise argument, the increasing costs argument, and the crowding out argument. As a result, those working in the constitutional political economy tradition are not justified in employing homo economicus, at least not until a new argument successfully defending the behavioral model is provided.
Can External Reasons Explain Actions?
Abstract: Bernard Williams claims that for a reason to actually be a reason, it must be capable of explaining an agent’s actions. He also claims that what are ostensibly external reasons are not capable of performing this explanatory function, and thus are not really reasons at all. This paper endeavors to further delve into the question of whether external reasons can explain actions by attempting to understand what it would look like for an external reason to do so. In going about this task the paper proposes a new manner through which external reasons can explain actions. Although this proposed explanatory mechanism deviates from the traditional way of understanding reason-giving explanation, it is a conception of explanation that I argue is satisfactory
Abstract: This paper revisits the conventional distinction in political science between “positive” and “normative” political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and they can provide insights into the practical workings of novel institutional arrangements in the absence of empirical data. The integration of formal models into normative political theory presents challenges, including the development of criteria for evaluating these models and potential shifts in research focus. Integration can also strengthen political theory’s tenuous role in the political science discipline.
Creative Destruction and the Autonomous Life
Abstract: This paper examines the tension between creative destruction—an inherent feature of capitalist economies—and the ideal of autonomy. Creative destruction is vital for economic growth, but it undermines the conditions necessary for autonomy by disrupting individuals’ ability to plan their lives. This creates a dilemma: we must either abandon the ideal of autonomy or economic growth. The paper explores potential regulatory strategies to mitigate the impact of disruptive innovation on life plans, but argues these ultimately fail. It then proposes a novel conception of autonomy consistent with capitalist creative destruction. With artificial intelligence poised to initiate unparalleled creative destruction, understanding this dilemma and potential solutions is crucial from an ethical perspective. The paper contends its revised conception of autonomy offers a path forward amidst transformative technological change.
The Moral Status of Pecuniary Externalities (coauthored with Jeffrey Carroll)
Abstract: Pecuniary externalities—costs imposed on third parties mediated through the price system—have typically received little philosophical attention. Recently, this has begun to change. In two separate papers, Richard Endörfer (2022) and Hayden Wilkinson (2022) place pecuniary externalities at center stage. Though their arguments differ significantly, both conclude pecuniary externalities are in some sense morally problematic. If the state is not called on to regulate pecuniary externalities, then, at the very least, individuals should be conscious of how their productive and consumptive decisions affect others by changing prices. We disagree. Both arguments fail, in that neither gives us reason to think pecuniary externalities are cause for moral concern. Unless a new argument emerges, pecuniary externalities should be left alone.
Political Epistemology (coauthored with Aylon Manor)
Abstract: Entry for the next edition of The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy.
There Is No Right To a Competent Electorate (coauthored with Jeffrey Carroll)
Abstract: This paper addresses the debate surrounding epistocracy. While many discussions of epistocracy focus on its instrumental defenses, this paper aims to critically examine the non-instrumental jury argument offered by Jason Brennan. Brennan’s argument equates the rights of individuals in political decisions to their rights in jury decisions, asserting that just as individuals have a right to a competent jury, they likewise have a right to a competent electorate. We disagree. By juxtaposing the costs of enforcing such rights and the severity of the harm prevented by their enforcement, this paper argues in favor of maintaining the right to a competent jury while denying the existence of a right to a competent electorate. The central claim is that while securing a competent jury is feasible and vital, attempting to secure a competent electorate poses significant challenges and may prevent less significant harm than perceived.
In Defense of Filibustering
Abstract: The Senate filibuster is among the most criticized political institutions in the United States. This paper examines the ethics of filibustering. The way filibustering currently proceeds in the Senate, I argue, is morally indefensible. Yet, there is a way filibustering could proceed that is both defensible and desirable from a normative perspective. This is because filibustering—if it is properly institutionalized—allows minority parties in the legislature to protect and advance their interests in a manner that avoids shortcomings faced by other institutions proposed to accomplish these goals, such as supermajority rule and judicial review.
In Defense of (Limited) Oligarchy
Abstract: In democracies around the world, the rich exercise a disproportionate share of political power. Democratic theorists universally condemn this. The current paper brings balance to this conversation by mustering a defense of limited oligarchy. I have two goals. First, I shall argue that we need not be overly despondent about the wealthy’s outsized influence, for overrepresentation of the wealthy performs some good for us, good which might not be entirely obvious at first glance. Second, I hope to temper reform efforts that seek to limit the wealthy’s influence. While the people should have a greater say than they currently do, the wealthy’s influence should still be greater than what their numbers suggest. I ultimately embrace oligarchic bicameralism, an old idea that proposes ordinary persons be represented in the lower chamber of the legislature, and property be represented in the upper. This is accomplished through a combination of sortition and elections.
In Defense of Knavish Constitutions
Abstract: A tradition in political economy holds that constitutions should be designed under the assumption that politicians are knaves. A criticism of this position says that a constitution so designed will cause political actors to behave worse than they otherwise would. Designing a constitution for knaves creates knaves. I critique this argument in the current paper. I advance two claims. First, all constitutions create knaves, because the activity of politics itself creates knaves. Second, knavish constitutions better cultivate virtue when compared to constitutions that lack knavish constraints and guardrails. Put together, the two arguments imply the criticism has it exactly backwards: if you want virtuous politicians, design constitutions under the assumption that they are knaves.
The Demand and Supply of False Consciousness
Abstract: Why do oppressive social and political systems persist for as long as they do? Critical theorists posit the oppressed are in the grip of ideology or false consciousness, leading them to voluntarily accept their servitude. An objection to this explanation points out that we have no account of how the ruling class’s ideology comes to dominate. One common reply says the ruling class’s ideology comes to dominate because they control major organizations like schools, churches, and news agencies. This response is seriously flawed, I argue. I then explore an alternative, neglected answer: the ruling class’s ideology dominates because believing it is good for the oppressed. After sketching some details, I explore the implications of this account for critical theory as a research program.
We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth
Abstract: Why pursue economic growth? For poor countries this is an easy question to answer, but it is more difficult for rich ones. Some of the world’s greatest philosophers and economists—such as John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and John Rawls—thought that, once a certain material standard of well-being has been achieved, economic growth should stop. I argue the opposite in this paper. We always have reason to pursue economic growth. My argument is indirect. I shall not argue that economic growth itself is always better. Rather, I shall argue that stopping growth requires morally objectionable actions. Economic growth tends to occur naturally if certain underlying conditions are in place. We have moral reasons to insist on these conditions independent their effect on growth, however. Halting growth requires we alter these conditions, but we ought not do this.
Finding the Epistocrats
Abstract: Concerned about widespread incompetence among voters in democratic societies, epistocrats propose quasi-democratic electoral systems that amplify the voices of competent voters while silencing (or perhaps just subduing) the voices of those deemed incompetent. In order to amplify the voices of the competent we first need to know what counts as political competence, and then we need a way of identifying those who possess the relevant characteristics. After developing an account of what it means to be politically competent, I argue that there is no way for the epistocrat to identify such persons. Therefore, epistocracy cannot be implemented.
Public Choice and Political Equality
Abstract: Public choice theory is a branch of economics that analyzes political institutions using the tools and methods of economics. This essay is about what public choice theory can teach us about political equality as a normative ideal, by focusing on the relationship between rent seeking and political inequality. One important lesson public choice theory teaches us is that political inequality is sometimes driven by unequal wealth, but is at other times driven by other, more subtle factors. Thus, even if we lived in a society where wealth was distributed in a perfectly equal manner, political inequality would still be a significant problem. Beyond teaching us about some of the root causes of political inequality, public choice theorists have also offered novel proposals for how to remedy this problem. Thus, by engaging the literature on public choice, philosophers can gain new insights about how to fight a pervasive problem confronting democratic societies.
Does Equality Persist? Evidence from the Homestead Act (coauthored with Bryan Leonard)
Abstract: Passed in 1862, the Homestead Act was an important piece of legislation that gave away 160 acres of land in the Western United States to any individual willing to settle, cultivate, and occupy the land for a period of five years. Social scientists have examined the various impacts of the act extensively, but not in terms of its original aims. Many of those who fought for passage of the act rested their case on the moral claim that all persons have an equal right to the soil. This paper examines the extent to which the Homestead Act actually lived up to this moral ideal. We ask: did the Homestead Act lead to greater equality in the ownership of land? We find that the act did achieve greater equality in the short run but, in the long run, this equality proved fleeting, disappearing within 100 years of the act’s passage. Click here for online appendix.
Reparations to the Privileged?
Abstract: Many believe that we owe reparations to groups who suffered significant injustice in the past. Oftentimes, groups who suffered historical injustice are not very well-off today, especially when compared to the groups who imposed the injustice on them. However, in some cases, groups who suffered historical injustice are better-off today than the groups who imposed the injustice on them. Under these circumstances, ought the now-better-off group who suffered historical injustice receive reparations from the now-worse-off group who were historical oppressors? Many will think not. Problematically, most of our current theories of reparations, I demonstrate, imply that worse-off groups must pay reparations to better-off groups, if the worse-off group committed a serious injustice against the better-off group in the past. Those theories that avoid this conclusion do so only by severely limiting when reparations are owed generally, leading them to counterintuitive results in more ordinary cases.
Lockeans against Labor Mixing
Abstract: The idea that labor mixing confers property in unowned resources is, for many, the very heart of the Lockean system of property. In this essay I shall argue that this common view is mistaken. Lockean theorists should reject labor mixing as the preferred method of first appropriation, and should adopt a different account of first appropriation instead. This is because labor mixing does not serve the central justification for the institution of property embraced by Lockeans. Thus, my argument is internal to the Lockean system; I rely only on premises that (many) Lockean theorists embrace. Though Lockeans should forsake labor mixing, that does not mean they should give up on property rights and the idea of first appropriation. In the paper’s final section, I sketch an account of first appropriation that Lockeans should embrace.
Secrecy and Transparency in Political Philosophy
Abstract: an overview of secrecy and transparency as they relate to questions in political philosophy, with an emphasis on the relevance of literature from economics and political science.
Asymmetric Idealization and the Market Process
Abstract: An essay on political philosophy methodology and market process theory.
When Public Reason Falls Silent: Liberal Democratic Justification versus the Administrative State (coauthored with Stephen G.W. Stich)
Abstract: Public reason theorists argue that coercive state action must be justified to those subject to such action. Doing so requires that reasons are given in defense of coercive policies that all can accept. These reasons, we argue, include scientific and social scientific considerations. One ineliminable and arguably salutary property of the modern administrative state is that the coercive policies it produces can be justified only on the basis of extremely complex scientific and social scientific considerations. Many of these considerations are neither understood by most ordinary citizens, nor are they agreed upon by experts. This means that the overwhelming majority of citizens do not accept the reasons justifying coercive administrative policies. As a result, public reason is inconsistent with the administrative state. There are deep implications to this result: if public reason is inconsistent with the administrative, then it is also inconsistent with forms of social organization that presuppose it. This, we argue, includes egalitarianism, which many proponents of public reason also endorse. Public reason theorists must thus choose: justification through public reason, or distributive equality?
Kant, Rawls, and the Possibility of Autonomy
Abstract: One feature of John Rawls’s well-ordered society in both A Theory of Justice (TJ) and Political Liberalism (PL) is that citizens in the well-ordered society, when adhering to the principles of justice governing that society, realize their full autonomy. This notion of full autonomy is explicitly Kantian. This constancy, I shall argue, raises problems. Though the model of the well-ordered society presented in TJ is arguably consistent with Kant’s notion of autonomy, the model of the well-ordered society presented in PL is not. The problem is that in the well-ordered society of PL people’s reasons for complying with the principles of justice are overdetermined in a problematic way. This raises the interesting question of acting from overdetermined motives in Kant’s system of ethics. In this paper I argue that regardless of which plausible interpretation of acting from overdetermined motives we adopt, the prospect of citizens realizing their full autonomy in Rawls’s PL are small. This is a serious defect of the theory.
The Future of Political Philosophy: Non-Ideal and West of Babel
Abstract: Within the last decade or so, political philosophers have undergone intense disagreement over the proper methodology of political philosophy. This paper contributes to and tries to move past this debate by offering a new way of thinking about what it is political philosophers are trying to do. Instead of being either ideal or non-ideal theorists, political philosophers can orient themselves east of Eden or west of Babel. After examining different possible research projects, I argue that the most promising route forward for political philosophers is theorizing that is non-ideal and west of Babel. The paper ends by articulating what such a research program might look like.
Rawlsian Originalism (coauthored with Alexander William Salter)
Abstract: How should judges reason in a well-ordered constitutional democracy? According to John Rawls’s famous remarks in Political Liberalism, they ought to do so in accordance with the idea of public reason, to the point that they act as an (if not the) institutional exemplar of public reason. There are many attractive features of this view, but it is still too vague. For the idea of public reason is permissive – it rules certain modes of reasoning and discourse out, but the modes of reasoning and discourse it deems permissible are pluralistic. The current paper tries to remedy this indeterminacy by further fleshing out how judges ought to reason in something like a Rawlsian well-ordered constitutional democratic society. Our conclusion may come as a surprise: judges in such a society should be Originalists.
The Supreme Court as the Fountain of Public Reason
Abstract: The idea of public reason requires that citizens in their public deliberation employ considerations stemming from a shared conception of justice. One worry is that public reason’s content will be incomplete, in that it does not contain sufficient material for adequate public debate. Rawls has a way of expanding the content of public reason to address such concerns – by including in public reason all those things you and me say in our justification of the conception of justice. After arguing that this strategy fails, a new way of expanding public reason’s content is proposed. Instead of understanding the Supreme Court – who Rawls famously calls the “exemplar” of public reason – as an institution that appeals to exogenously determined public reasons, we should understand the judicial authority in a liberal democratic society as an endogenous fountain of public reason.
Moral Diversity and Moral Responsibility (coauthored with Robert H. Wallace)
Abstract: In large, impersonal moral orders many of us wish to maintain good will towards our fellow citizens only if we are reasonably sure they will maintain good will towards us. The mutual maintaining of good will, then, requires we somehow communicate our intentions to one another. But how do we actually do this? The current paper argues that when we engage in moral responsibility practices – that is, when we express our reactive attitudes by blaming, praising, and resenting – we communicate a desire to maintain good will to those in the community we are imbedded in. Participating in such practices alone won’t get the job done, though, for expressions of our reactive attitudes are often what economists call cheap talk. But, when we praise and blame in cases of moral diversity, expressions of our reactive attitudes act as costly signals capable of solving our social dilemma.
Enough and as Good: a Formal Model of Lockean First Appropriation (coauthored with Benjamin Ogden)
Abstract: In developing a theory of the first appropriation of natural resources from the state of nature John Locke tells us that persons must leave “enough and as good” for others. Detailing exactly what this restriction requires divides right and left libertarians. Briefly, right libertarians interpret “enough and as good” as requiring no or very minimal restrictions on the first appropriation of natural resources, whereas left libertarians interpret “enough and as good” as requiring everyone be entitled to an equal share of unappropriated resources, able to claim no more beyond this equal share. This paper approaches the right versus left libertarian debate by developing a formal model that examines the welfare properties of different interpretations of the Lockean proviso. The model shows that underlying philosophical justifications for left libertarianism, when plausible assumptions hold, will actually be better served by a right libertarian proviso rather than a left libertarian one.
Diversity and Rights: a Social Choice-Theoretic Analysis of the Possibility of Public Reason (coauthored with Hun Chung)
Abstract: Public reason liberalism takes as its starting point the deep and irreconcilable diversity we find characterizing liberal societies. This deep and irreconcilable diversity creates problems for social order. One method for adjudicating these conflicts is through the use of rights. This paper is about the ability of such rights to adjudicate disputes when perspectival disagreements – or disagreements over how to categorize objects in the world – obtain. We present both formal possibility and impossibility results for rights structures under varying degrees of perspectival diversity. We show that though perspectival diversity appears to be a troubling problem for the prospect of stable social order, if rights are defined properly then disagreements can likely be resolved in a consistent manner, achieving social cooperation rather than conflict.
Justificatory Failures and Moral Entrepreneurs: a Hayekian Theory of Public Reason
Abstract: Public reason liberalism says that in order to treat persons as free and equal they must accept the rules we impose on them as justified. A trite yet powerful criticism of the public reason project says that, given the diversity we find characterizing contemporary liberal societies, there are no rules meeting such a requirement. This paper uses the tools and insights from F.A. Hayek’s social philosophy to respond to such an objection. It argues first that the strong version of this criticism relies on assumptions that Hayek shows are untenable. But still, there is a modified version of this objection that does not commit such errors. Even so, Hayek’s insights show us that, through market competition acting as a discovery procedure, we can find rules and institutions that we do not yet know of capable of living up to the public reason liberal’s justificatory demands. This, it is argued, is the best hope we have of satisfying the twin ideals of freedom and equality lying at the very heart of liberalism.
Buchanan and Arrow on Democracy, Impossibility and Market
Abstract: In Social Choice and Individual Values Kenneth Arrow advances the claim that his impossibility theorem indicts both voting and the market as irrational methods of collective choice. Though most ignored such remarks and took the theorem to indict only democratic voting procedures, James M. Buchanan did take Arrow’s remarks seriously and argued that, contra Arrow’s initial claim, the theorem indicts voting but not the market. This paper analyzes the Arrow-Buchanan debate on this point: whether the famous impossibility theorem indicts voting and the market as Arrows claims, or just voting as Buchanan claims. It concludes that, due to certain features of the market process highlighted by Buchanan, Arrow’s impossibility theorem indicts voting as an irrational method of collective choice but leaves untouched the market.
Rawls, Buchanan, and the Search for a Better Social Contract
Abstract: This paper explores the strengths and weaknesses of John Rawls’s and James M. Buchanan’s social contract theories through the lens of two plausible success conditions any social contract theory ought to satisfy: what we call the identity and recognition tests. We find both successes and failings in both theories: whereas Rawls’s theory excels across recognition but fails across identity, Buchanan’s theory succeeds across identity but falters when it comes to recognition. To end, a new model of the social contract is proposed that combines the best elements of Rawls’s and Buchanan’s respective theories. The final result, hopefully, is a superior model of the social contract that displays greater fidelity to the original goals of the social contract enterprise in the first place.
Public Reason's Chaos Theorem
Abstract: Citizens in John Rawls’s well-ordered society face an assurance dilemma. They wish to act justly only if they are reasonably sure their fellow citizens will also act justly. According to Rawls, this assurance problem is solved through public reasoning. This paper argues that public reason cannot serve this function. It begins by arguing that one kind of incompleteness public reason faces that most Rawlsians grant is ubiquitous but unproblematic from a normative standpoint is problematic from an assurance perspective: it makes it possible for citizens to argue for policy conclusions that are favored by their private interests, rather than justice. In response, perhaps the thing to do is structure deliberative democratic institutions such that citizens will always be incentivized to use public reasons to only argue for conclusions they believe are favored by justice. The paper proves that this is impossible by extending the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
What We Choose, What We Prefer
Abstract: This paper develops an account of what it is that rational agents choose and what it is that rational agents prefer. There are three desiderata to satisfy when offering such an account. First, the account should maintain canonical axioms of rational choice theory as intuitively plausible. Here I focus on contraction and expansion consistency properties. Second, the account should prevent canonical axioms of rational choice theory from becoming trivial – it should be possible to actually violate these axioms, less rational choice theory becomes useless for many purposes. Third, the account should allow rational choice theory to be put to several different philosophical projects. I show that existing accounts of what we choose and prefer fail along at least one of these metrics. The account I develop does not fail across any of these metrics.
Aggregating Out of Indeterminacy: Social Choice Theory to the Rescue
Abstract: This paper explores public reason liberalism’s indeterminacy problem, a problem that obtains when we admit significant diversity into our justificatory model. The paper argues first that Gerald Gaus’s solution to the indeterminacy problem is unsatisfactory and second that, contra Gaus’s concerns, social choice theory is able to solve public reason’s indeterminacy problem. Moreover, social choice theory can do so in a way that avoids the worries raised against Gaus’s solution to the indeterminacy problem as well as the worries Gaus himself raises against the use of social choice mechanisms. Social choice theory thus rescues public reason liberalism by aggregating out of indeterminacy
Justice, Diversity, and the Well-Ordered Society
Abstract: One unchanging feature of Rawls’s thought is that we theorize about well-ordered societies. Yet, once we introduce justice pluralism – the fact that reasonable people disagree about the nature and requirements of justice, something Rawls eventually admits is inevitable in liberal societies – then a well-ordered society as Rawls defines it is impossible. This requires we develop new models of society to replace the well-ordered society in order to adequately address such disagreements. To do so we ought to remain faithful to those reasons Rawls has for introducing the idea of the well-ordered society in the first place. It is shown that two models that resemble closely Rawls’s model of the well-ordered society but are also capable of dealing with justice pluralism do not perform well when judged against such criteria. Yet a new model of the well-ordered society – one that looks radically different from what Rawls originally imagined – does succeed.
When Public Reason Fails Us: Convergence Discourse as Blood Oath (coauthored with Stephen G.W. Stich)
Abstract: Public officials in John Rawls’s well-ordered society face an assurance problem. They prefer to act in accordance with the political conception of justice, but only if they are assured that others will do so. On Paul Weithman’s influential interpretation, Rawls attempts to solve the assurance problem by claiming that public reason is an assurance mechanism. There are several major problems with Rawls’s solution: public reason talk is too cheap to facilitate assurance, it is difficult to know when a given utterance expresses a public reason, and the requirements of public reason are in tension with the fact of reasonable pluralism. In this paper we argue that convergence discourse – not public reason – solves the assurance problem because it is a costly signal that indicates commitment to the political conception. This solution has none of Rawls’s problems, and has an interesting corollary: the more diversity, the better.
Rational Choice Theory (coauthored with Gerald Gaus)
Abstract: An overview of rational choice theory and its applications to political philosophy.
The Irrelevance of the Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism (coauthored with Stephen G.W. Stich)
Abstract: In “The Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism” Braham and van Hees prove that four conditions on rights—completeness, conclusiveness, non-imposition, and symmetry—cannot be satisfied simultaneously. If Braham and van Hees’s proof is to have any relevance, at least some prominent libertarians must endorse their four conditions, and libertarianism as a philosophical position must in some way be committed to all the axioms. In this paper we demonstrate the irrelevance of Braham and van Hees’s proof by showing that some of the most prominent libertarians do not endorse the completeness and conclusive conditions, and that there is nothing about libertarianism as a philosophical position that commits the libertarian to these two axioms. Indeed, we show that, more generally, there are strong reasons for libertarians to reject both conditions. As such, libertarians should not lose any sleep over Braham and van Hees’s proof.
Modeling the Individual for Constitutional Choice
Abstract: This paper is about the use of the homo economicus behavioral model in the constitutional political economy research program. The paper argues that all existing arguments in defense of the behavioral model fail. These arguments are: the symmetry argument, the enterprise argument, the increasing costs argument, and the crowding out argument. As a result, those working in the constitutional political economy tradition are not justified in employing homo economicus, at least not until a new argument successfully defending the behavioral model is provided.
Can External Reasons Explain Actions?
Abstract: Bernard Williams claims that for a reason to actually be a reason, it must be capable of explaining an agent’s actions. He also claims that what are ostensibly external reasons are not capable of performing this explanatory function, and thus are not really reasons at all. This paper endeavors to further delve into the question of whether external reasons can explain actions by attempting to understand what it would look like for an external reason to do so. In going about this task the paper proposes a new manner through which external reasons can explain actions. Although this proposed explanatory mechanism deviates from the traditional way of understanding reason-giving explanation, it is a conception of explanation that I argue is satisfactory